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THE NEW SETTLEMENT STATUTE:
ITS HISTORY AND EFFECT
The statute concerning releases in multiple tortfeasor cases
was amended to encourage settlements in two ways. It
protects the settling tortfeasor from future liability for
contribution, and it protects the settling claimant from having
future judgments against non-settling tortfeasors reduced by
more than an amount ascertainable at the time of the
settlement. This article discusses the operation of the new
statute and its relation to the law of contribution, indemnity,
and comparative fault in Missouri.
INTRODUCTION. The 82nd General
Assembly amended Section 537.060,
RSMo (1978) to clarify the effect of set-
tlements with respect to the settling
tortfeasor's liability for contribution to
the non-settling tortfeasor. 1 This right is
also sometimes referred to as non-
contractual indemnity. 2 To simplify
matters, it will be referred to as a right
to contribution in this article. The stat-
ute, as amended, provides that a settling
tortfeasor who has obtained a release
from the claimant cannot be held liable
for contribution in an action brought by
a joint tortfeasor. The statute does not
deal with his potential liability for in-
demnity, as opposed to contribution,
and the effect of a settlement on this
liability.
The statute, prior to amendment,
dealt with two subjects. First, it created
a right of contribution among joint judg-
ment debtors. Second, it authorized a
claimant to settle with one of several
joint tortfeasors and release him without
impairing his claim against the other
joint tortfeasors. The amendment did
not deal with the first part of the statute.
It substituted the following new settle-
ment provision for the old provision:
When an agreement by release, covenant
not to sue or not to enforce a judgment is
given in good faith to one of two or more
persons liable in tort for the same injury or
wrongful death such agreement shall not dis-
charge any of the other tortfeasors for the
damage unless the terms of the agreement so
provide, however such agreement shall re-
duce the claim by the stipulated amount of
the agreement, or in the amount of consid-
eration paid, whichever is greater. The
agreement shall discharge the tortfeasor to
whom it is given from all liability for con-
tribution or non-contractual indemnity to
any other tortfeasor. The term "non-
contractual indemnity" as used in this sec-
tion refers to indemnity between joint tort-
feasors culpably negligent, having no legal
relationship to each other and does not in-
clude indemnity which comes about by
reason of contract, or by reason of vicarious
liability.
ABOUT THE AUTHOR. Mr. Fischer is a
professor of law at the University of Mis-
souri-Columbia. He received a J.D. degree
in 1968 from the University of Missouri-
Columbia. He is a member of The Missouri
Bar. As a member of the Tort Law Commit-
tee of The Missouri Bar, Mr. Fischer helped
draft the new settlement statute.
14 / JOURNAL OF MISSOURI BAR / January-February 1984
The following example illustrates how
the new settlement provision works:
Passenger is injured in an intersection
collision involving a car in which he is
riding and a truck. The car was driven
by Driver and the truck was driven by
Trucker. Passenger sues Driver and
Trucker, alleging negligence, and
claiming damages of $15,000. Each de-
fendant cross-claims against the other
for apportionment of fault. Prior to trial
Passenger settles with Driver for $2,000
and releases him. Passenger proceeds to
trial against Trucker, and obtains a ver-
dict in his favor for $10,000.
Under the new statute Passenger
would be able to recover only $8,000
from Trucker because the statute re-
quires his judgment to be reduced by
the amount of the settlement with Driv-
er. If Passenger collects this sum,
Trucker would not be entitled to con-
tribution from Driver. The end result is
that Driver pays $2,000 and Trucker
pays $8,000.
The above analysis depends on cer-
tain assumptions. Passenger's action
against Trucker would have been barred
if the settlement had provided full com-
pensation for the loss. 3 Also, the statute
provides that Passenger would have
been prohibited from proceeding
against Trucker if the agreement had
released him as well as Driver. Similar-
ly, Passenger's judgment against Truck-
er would have been reduced by more
than the $2,000 settlement amount if
the agreement had so provided.
Another qualification is that Driver is
protected from having to pay contribu-
tion only if the release was given in good
faith. At a minimum this requires that
the settlement with Passenger not be
collusive.4 Good faith may be broader
than merely prohibiting collusion. One
court held an agreement to have been
made in bad faith because it gave the
settling tortfeasor so much control over
the claimant's right to settle with the
remaining tortfeasors that the statutory
objective of encouraging settlements
was defeated.'
The amended statute treats a cove-
nant not to sue and a covenant not to
enforce a judgment in the same way as a
release. A covenant not to enforce a
judgment is like a covenant not to sue
except it is given after suit is filed.6 It
protects the settling tortfeasor from a
contribution action, but only if it is given
prior to the entry of judgment.'
NEED FOR THE LEGISLATION.
Prior to Missouri Pacific Railroad v.
Whitehead & Kales Co. 8 the above
hypothetical would have been resolved
the same way under the old settlement
statue as under the new statue, i.e., the
settling tortfeasor pays $2,000 and the
non-settling tortfeasor pays $8,000.
Under the old statute Plaintiffs verdict
was reduced by the amount of the
settlement, 9 and there was no right of
contribution between concurrent or
joint tortfeasors1 ° who were not joint
judgment debtors.1 1 The right to in-
demnity, as recognized by Missouri
courts, would not apply under these
circumstances. 12
The Whitehead & Kales case raised
the possibility of a different result in that
it created a right of contribution among
joint tortfeasors regardless of whether a
joint judgment had been rendered
against them. 13 The court has not stated
whether a release or covenant not to sue
by the claimant would be a defense in a
contribution action by the non-settling
tortfeasor against the settling tortfeasor.
However, the possibility that the court
might hold that it is not a defense has
inhibited settlements in Missouri, and
the new settlement statute was enacted
to cure this problem.
If Driver's release did not protect him
from Trucker's action for contribution
he would not have settled with Passen-
ger because he would have remained
subject to the risk of both paying addi-
tional damages and bearing the cost of
litigating the case. From Driver's point
of view, it makes no difference whether
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he has to defend himself in an action for
contribution or in an action seeking
damages for negligence. No rational
tortfeasor would settle under such cir-
cumstances because he has nothing to
gain from the settlement.
It is possible for the tortfeasor to pro-
tect himself by obtaining an agreement
from the claimant to indemnify him in
the event he is held liable for contribu-
tion in an action brought by the non-
settling tortfeasor; 14 unfortunately, a
rational claimant would almost never
agree to this. Therefore, this device is
useful to facilitate settlements only in
rare cases.
The disadvantage of the indemnity
agreement is that it creates great uncer-
tainty with regard to the outcome of the
lawsuit against the non-settling tort-
feasor. The basis for apportionment of
damages under Whitehead & Kales is
the relative fault of the joint
tortfeasors.15 At the time the claimant
settles with a tortfeasor, he cannot know
what percentage of fault the jury will
later attribute to him. Yet this per-
centage is key to determining whether
plaintiff will have to indemnify the set-
tling tortfeasor, and if so, for how much.
The above example can be used to
illustrate the degree of uncertainty cre-
ated by this variable. If the jury were to
find Driver 20% at fault and Trucker
80% at fault, then Driver's pro rata share
of the damages is $2,000 and Trucker's
pro rata share is $8,000. Under these
circumstances Trucker would have no
right of contribution against Driver, and
Passenger would not have to indemnify
Driver. However, if the jury were to
find that Driver was 80% at fault and
Trucker was 20% at fault, then Trucker's
pro rata share of the damages would be
only $2,000. If Passenger were to collect
the $8,000 judgment from Trucker,
then Trucker would have a right to col-
lect $6,000 from Driver, and Passenger
would have to indemnify Driver for this
full amount. Passenger would ultimate-
ly receive a net amount of only $4,000.
These illustrations show that where
plaintiff gives the settling tortfeasor an
indemnity agreement, his total recovery
is drastically affected by the jury's deter-
mination of relative fault. Yet, predict-
ing with accuracy how the jury will de-
cide such issues is obviously impossible.
It is easy 'to understand why a
claimant would be unwilling to inject
this additional element of uncertainty
into his lawsuit. This is especially true in
view of the awkward position he finds
himself in at trial with respect to the
issue. The defendant, of course, has a
strong incentive to place as much blame
as possible on the settling tortfeasor,
The settling tortfeasor
has no financial incentive
to defend himself
and the settling tortfeasor has no finan-
cial incentive to defend himself. Since
the plaintiff has no control over the set-
tling tortfeasor, he will have to spend a
large part of his energy trying to con-
vince the jury that the settling tortfeasor
was not very much at fault. He would
obviously be better off ifhe could devote
his full effort making his case rather than
trying to minimize the role of one of the
wrongdoers.
The need to protect the settling tort-
feasor from a contribution action by the
non-settling tortfeasor is verified by the
experience of the Commissioners of
Uniform Laws under the 1939 version of
the Uniform Contribution Among Tort-
feasors Act. 6 That act provided that a
release did not protect the settling tort-
feasor unless it provided for a reduction
of the claimant's damages "to the extent
of the pro rata share of the released
tortfeasor."'17 This provision was one of
the chief objections to the adoption of
the 1939 act and one of the main causes
for complaint where it was adopted be-
cause it discouraged settlements.' 8 The
16 / JOURNAL OF MISSOURI BAR / January-February 1984
Commissioners changed the rule in the
1955 version of the act in order to en-
courage settlements. '
9
HISTORY OF THE LEGISLATION.
The amendment was largely based on
section 4 of the 1955 version of the Uni-
form Contribution Among Tortfeasors
Act. The Uniform Act is in nine sections,
and creates a comprehensive scheme for
permitting contribution among joint
tortfeasors. 20 By express provision it
does not impair any right to indemnity
under existing law, and where a right to
indemnity exists, contribution is not
available. 21 Section 4 of the Uniform Act
restricts the non-settling tortfeasor's
right to contribution against the settling
tortfeasor. It has no application to the
effect of a settlement on the right to
indemnity because indemnity and con-
tribution are mutually exclusive rem-
edies under the act, and the act does not
impair any right to indemnity. 22
Because section 4 of the Uniform Act
neither creates the right to contribu-
tion, nor defines its essential character-
istics, it is compatible with any scheme
of contribution. The impact of section 4
on the law of contribution is limited to
the effect that a settlement has on the
right to contribution. It should in no
other way affect the growth and de-
velopment of the law of contribution in
Missouri.
The final version of the bill to amend
Section 537.060 was a House Commit-
tee Substitute for original House Bills
135 and 194. House Bill 13523 was
drafted by the Tort Law Committee of
The Missouri Bar, was approved by the
Board of Governors of The Missouri
Bar, and was sponsored by Representa-
tive Smith. House Bill 19424 was drafted
by the Missouri Association of Trial
Lawyers, and was sponsored by Repre-
sentative Youngdahl. While both bills
were based on section 4 of the Uniform
Act, they did differ in the language used
to describe the action .brought by one
joint tortfeasor against another joint
tortfeasor seeking contribution. 25 The
House Committee substitute ironed out
this difference in language and added a
clause defining one of the terms.
2 6
The terminology problem arose be-
cause of the way Missouri courts use the
word "indemnity." In most jurisdictions
indemnity refers to a shifting of the en-
tire loss from one party to another party,
while contribution refers to a partial
shifting of the loss. 27 Missouri used the
terms in this way prior to the Whitehead
& Kales decision.2 ' That case, in effect,
created a right of comparative contribu-
tion based on relative fault of the
tortfeasors;2 9 however, it referred to
this as a right to "non-contractual
indemnity" 30 rather than as a right to
It carefully defined
contractual indemnity
contribution. It carefully defined non-
contractual indemnity so as to restrict
the right to cases where a partial shifting
of the loss was appropriate, and to dis-
tinguish it from cases where it is
appropriate to shift the entire loss.
3 1
The resulting amendment to the stat-
ute is almost identical to section 4 of the
Uniform Act, except that in addition to
denying the non-settling tortfeasor a
right to "contribution" from the settling
tortfeasor, it also denies him the right to"non-contractual indemnity." 32 The
amended statute defines the phrase
"'non-contractual indemnity" in the
same way that the Whitehead & Kales
case defines it. 3 Thus, the amendment
refers to the right to contribution in the
same language used by Missouri courts,
and -places a limitation on it in cases
where there has been a settlement. The
statute does not deal with situations
where Whitehead & Kales does not ap-
ply because a sharing of the loss is in-
appropriate. Therefore, if a common law
right to indemnity exists against the set-
tling torifeasor in such cases, the effect
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of a settlement on that right is un-
affected by the statute. This modifica-
tion insures that the scope of the statute
in Missouri is the same as the intended
scope of section 4 of the Uniform Act in
that it deals with the effect of a release
on an action for contribution but it does
not deal with the effect of a release on
indemnity actions.' The other devia-
tions from the Uniform Act were edito-
rial.
CONTRIBUTION AND INDEMNI-
TY IN MISSOURI. Situations where a
right to contribution exists in Missouri
may be briefly summarized as follows.
The right only applies between concur-
rent tortfeasors who are culpably negli-
gent, and whose negligence directly
caused the victim's injuries. 5 There is
no right to contribution between succes-
sive tortfeasors, 36 where the liability of
one of the parties is purely vicarious,
37
or where an obligation to indemnity is
based on contract.38
Where there is right to contribution,
it applies regardless of whether the vic-
tim has obtained a joint judgment
against the tortfeasors, 9 and regardless
of whether contribution is sought in the
original proceeding' ° or in a separate
suit.4 1 A concurrent tortfeasor settling
with the claimant for the full amount of
damages may maintain an action for con-
tribution against the non-settling
tortfeasor.
42
While the right to full indemnity may
be based on a contractual agreement,
43
courts recognize the right in several
non-contractual situations as well. 4 4 For
example, one who without fault is held
vicariously liable for the negligence of
another has a right to be fully indemni-
fied by the other.4 1 In the case of succes-
sive tortfeasors, where the original tort-
feasor is liable for aggravation of injuries
caused by the subsequent tortfeasor,
the original tortfeasor has a right to be
reimbursed for the full amount of dam-
age caused by the subsequent
tortfeasor.46 However, the subsequent
tortfeasor has no right to reimburse-
ment from the original tortfeasor be-
cause he is liable only for the aggrava-
tion he caused, not the entire damage.
47
A seller of a defective product who is
held strictly liable in tort may have a
right to be indemnified by the man-
ufacturer.48
EFFECT OF SETTLEMENT ON
RIGHT OF INDEMNITY. Where a
defendant has a right to be indemnified
by another person, how does a release of
that person by the plaintiff affect the
right to indemnity? Because the
amended statute does not deal with the
effect of a release on the right of the
non-settling party to be indemnified,4 9
case law necessarily controls. The result
will vary, depending upon the circum-
stances.
For example, where an original tort-
feasor is liable for aggravation of injuries
caused by a subsequent tortfeasor, the
original torifeasor's right to indemnity
by the subsequent tortfeasor is not cut
off by the victim's release of the subse-
quent tortfeasor. 50 A contrary result
would be unfair because, as between the
two tortfeasors, the subsequent tort-
feasor ought to bear the loss since he
negligently caused it.
5 1
Where there is an express contract of
indemnity, a release by the accident vic-
tim of the person having the obligation
to indemnify does not cut off the other
contracting party's right to be indemni-
fied if he is held liable to the accident
victim. 52
In cases where a non-negligent mas-
ter's right to indemnity is based on vi-
carious liability for the negligence of his
servant, the right becomes moot when
the victim releases the servant because
the liability of the master is extinguished
by the release. 53 Since the master's
liability is derivative only, it would be
unfair to hold him liable when the
wrongdoer cannot be liable to the victim
either because of a release 54 or covenant
not to sue. In the converse situation,
where the non-negligent master settles
with the victim and obtains a full re-
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lease, it is not clear that his right to be
indemnified by the negligent servant is
affected. He may well have a right to
prevail in an indemnity action against
the servant upon a showing of the ser-
vant's negligence within the scope of
employment.5"
An argument can be made that the
amended statute changes the common
law rule that the release of the servant
also releases the master57 because the
statute provides that "such agreement
shall not discharge any of the other tort-
feasors for the damage unless the terms
of the agreement so provide . ...,sThe
counter argument is that the statute
does not change the common law rule
because the above-quoted clause does
not apply to a non-negligent master
since he is not a tortfeasor.59 Regardless
of how this dispute is resolved, a settle-
ment pursuant to the statute would not
deprive the master of his right to in-
demnity since the statute does not pur-
port to cut off this right.60
COMPATIBILITY WITH COM-
PARATIVE NEGLIGENCE. In Gus-
tafson v. Benda6 1 the Supreme Court of
Missouri adopted a system of pure com-
parative fault to be applied "[i]nsofar as
possible . . . in accordance with" sec-
tions 1-6 of the Uniform Comparative
Fault Act, 12 U.L.A. Supp. 35-45
(1983). These sections of the act create a
comprehensive system of comparative
fault and comparative contribution
among tortfeasors. They also specify the
manner set-off is handled, and the effect
of a release of one tortfeasor in joint
tortfeasor cases.
The court recognized62 that, in multi-
ple tortfeasor cases, the effect of a re-
lease is different under the Uniform
Comparative Fault Act than it is under
the new Missouri statute in that it re-
duces the injured person's claim against
other tortfeasors by "the amount of the
released person's equitable share of the
obligation. . . ."' The court urged the
legislature to adopt the approach taken
in the Uniform Comparative Fault Act,
but indicated that it would abide by the
terms of the statute in the meantime.
The new settlement statute is com-
patible with a scheme of pure compara-
tive negligence. Other jurisdictions,
with similar settlement statutes, have
continued to enforce them after the
adoption of pure comparative neg-
ligence.64 The choice represented by
the two statutory approaches is between
the policy of encouraging settlements
and the policy of allocating losses in
accordance with proportionate fault.
65
Encouraging settlements remains a very
worthy policy even after the adoption of
comparative negligence.
66
CONSTITUTIONALITY. West v. Roll-
haven Skating Arena67 held section 4 of
the Uniform Contribution Among Tort-
feasors Act constitutional. In the case
the non-settling tortfeasor claimed that
the act violated due process and equal
protection because the settlement cut
off his right to contribution from the
settling tortfeasor. The court held that
the termination of his right to contribu-
tion was justified by the state's interest
in encouraging settlements.
68
The West case appears to have cor-
rectly applied the underlying constitu-
tional principles. Under the Due Pro-
cess clause the statute is constitutional
as long as the denial of the right to con-
tribution bears a rational relationship to
the objective of encouraging set-
tlements. 69 This is essentially the same
standard that applies in equal protection
cases. 7 0 There is a rational basis for the
statute. 71 As pointed out previously, 72a
rule permitting contribution against the
settling tortfeasor greatly increases the
difficulty of obtaining settlement in any
case involving multiple torifeasors. The
statute is neither under-inclusive nor
over-inclusive 73 because it removes a
real impediment to settlements in all
multiple tortfeasor cases, and it only ap-
plies in multiple tortfeasor cases. Fur-
thermore, the non-settling tortfeasor is
adequately protected from collusive set-
tlements and settlements that do not
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further the policy underlying the statute
by having the opportunity to establish
that the agreement was not made in
good faith. 7
In State ex rel. Tarrasch v. Crow7 5
the court suggested that cutting off a
non-settling tortfeasor's right to indem-
nity because of a settlement agreement
to which he was not a party would
violate due process. This, however,
does not imply that the amended statute
is unconstitutional because Tarrasch
dealt with indemnity rather than con-
tribution. In fact, the court in Tarrasch
expressly distinguished cases from other
jurisdictions terminating the right to
contribution because of a settlement.76
It is much harsher to extinguish the
right to indemnity than the right to con-
tribution because indemnity is normally
awarded to one who, for policy reasons,
has been required to pay for harm
caused by another. His right to indem-
nity permits him to shift the loss back to
the tortfeasor who is primarily at fault. If
release of the tortfeasor who caused the
harm cuts off the other's right to in-
demnity, he must permanently bear
that loss.
RETROACTIVITY. Retroactive ap-
plication of the amended statute to a
release given prior to its effective date
must be resolved by the courts because
the amended statute does not deal with
the issue. Guidance may be found in
decisions of jurisdictions holding that
section 4 of the Uniform Contribution
Among Tortfeasors Act is not ret-
roactive. 
77
INSTRUCTING THE JURY. In cases
where plaintiff settles with one tort-
feasor and proceeds to trial against
another, the amended statute does not
prescribe how to instruct the jury.
Therefore, this remains a procedural
matter which is appropriately handled
by cotirt rule. Under present rules, the
judge merely credits any prior pay-
ments against the damages found by the
jury. 78 The jury is not informed of the
settlement unless it is required to re-
solve an issue of fact such as the ex-
istence or amount of a settlement
payment. 79
CONCLUSION. The new settlement
statute will encourage settlements in
multiple tortfeasor cases because it ex-
onerates the settling tortfeasor from
liability for contribution as long as the
agreement was made in good faith. Yet,
because the statute is drawn narrowly, it
ought not inhibit the growth and de-
velopment of the law of contribution and
indemnity in Missouri. Since it is based
on a uniform act, there is ample case law
available to aid in interpreting the new
provision. l
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